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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents D. Scott McGregor and Eldon L. Rich-
ardson, II, brought the instant action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that a certain "Compensation Agreement• dated 
December 3, 1981, was null and void and of no force and 
ef feet against the respondents. Respondents also sought 
damages based on certain alleged fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions of the appellants and for breach by defendant-appel-
lant Benz of his fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to the 
respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 12, 1983, appellants Peter A. Benz and 
David Cowan filed a certain Motion for Leave to File an 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional 
Parties. On March 7, 1983, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
District Judge, issued an Order Denying Motion of Defendants 
Peter A. Benz and David Cowan for Leave to File Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties and a 
certain Memorandum Decision setting forth his reasons for 
the Order. Respondents and appellants subsequently stipu-
lated to the entry of judgment in favor of respondents on 
one of respondents' claims and the dismissal of respondents' 
- 1 -
remaining claims. Appellants have appealed from Junge 
Hanson's Order and Memorandum Decision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an affirmance by the Utah Supreme 
Court of the Order and Memorandum Decision issued by the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying defen-
dants' -appellants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents generally agree with the Statement of 
Facts set forth in Appellants' Brief at pages 2 through 4. 
However, in order to fully understand Judge Hanson's Order 
and Memorandum Decision of March 7, 1983, a review of the 
history of this action up to and including March 7, 1983, is 
necessary. The following is a history of this action: 
l. On January 28, 1982, respondents D. Scott 
McGregor and Eldon L. Richardson, II, filed a certain 
Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Respondents' Complaint sought a 
Declaratory Judgment that a certain "Compensation Agreement" 
- 2 -
was void and unenforceable as against McGregor and Richard-
son. (Transcript, pp. 2-11). 
2. Apellant David Cowan is a citizen and resident 
of the State of Utah. Apellant Peter A. Benz is a resident, 
citizen and a member of the Bar of the State of New Jersey. 
Jurisdiction over the person of appellant Benz was asserted 
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Long Arm Statute, 
Utah Code Ann. SS 78-27-24(1) and (3) (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977). 
3. On March 3, 1982, appellant Benz filed a 
certain Motion to Quash Service or, in the Alternative, 
Motion to Dismiss. (Transcript, pp. 29-30). 
4. The Motion of Defendant Peter A. Benz to Quash 
Service or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss, was heard before 
the Law and Motion Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
David B. Dee presiding, on March 11, 1982, at the hour of 
2:00 p.m. 
s. Based upon the pleadings on 
the affidavits of Peter A. Benz, David 
file, including 
Cowan, D. Scott 
McGregor and Eldon L. Richardson, II, and having heard the 
arguments of counsel .and being fully advised in the prem-
ises, on March 19, 1982, the Honorable David B. Dee, Dis-
trict Judge, entered certain Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and issued an Order Denying Motion of Defendant 
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Peter A. Benz to Quash Service or, in the Alternative, to 
Dismiss. (Transcript, pp. 94-96). Pursuant to that Order, 
Benz was granted ten (10) days, until March 29, 1982, to 
file an Answer to the Complaint. (Transcript, p. 95). 
6. On March 18, 1982, respondents gave notice of 
the taking of the deposition of Peter A. Benz on Tuesday, 
April 20, 1982. (Transcript, pg. 75). Also on March 18, 
1982, respondents served notice of the taking of the depo-
sition of David Cowan on Wednesday, April 21, 1982. (Trans-
cript, p. 7 3) • 
7. On March 18, 1982, respondents served upon 
counsel for Benz Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of 
Documents Directed to Defendant Peter A. Benz. (Transcript, 
pp. 81-84). Said documents were to be produced by Benz at 
9:00 a.m. on Monday, April 19, 1982. (Transcript, pp. 
77-84). 
8. On March 29, 1982, appellant David Cowan filed 
his Answer to respondents' Complaint. Cowan' s Answer 
asserted none of the counterclaims which he and appellant 
Peter A. Benz now contend are compulsory counterclaims. 
(Transcript, pp. 95-100). 
9. Also on March 29, 1982, appellant Peter A. 
Benz, rather than filing an Answer to respondents' Complaint 
as ordered by the Third Judicial District Court on March 19, 
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1982, filed a Petition for Intermediate Appeal with this 
Court contesting Judge David B. Dee's Order of March 19, 
1982, on the ground that the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, could not assert in 
personam jurisdiction over him. 
10. On April 14, 1982, this Court denied the 
Petition for Intermediate Appeal filed by appellant Peter A. 
Benz. 
11. On April 15, 1982, seventeen (17) days after 
he was required to file an Answer to respondents' Complaint, 
four ( 4) days prior to the date that documents were to be 
produced pursuant to Plaintiffs' First Request for Produc-
tion of Documents and six (6) days prior to the date set for 
the taking of his deposition, appellant Benz filed a certain 
Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Responsive 
Pleading, in Which to Respond to Discovery Request, and for 
Protective Order. (Transcript, pp. 105-108). On April 19, 
1982, Benz' Motion was heard before the Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. At 
the con cl us ion of the Hearing, Judge Rigtrup ordered: 
(a) That Peter A. Benz be granted an add i-
t ion al ten ( 10) days to file an Answer to plaintiffs' 
Complaint; 
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(b) That Peter A. Benz be granted an addi-
tional ten ( 10) days to respond to Plaintiffs' First 
Request for Production of Documents; 
(c) That the deposition of Benz be taken 
within twenty ( 20) 
(d) That 
days of the Court's Order; 
plaintiffs advance the air 
and 
fare 
necessary to enable Benz to travel to Salt Lake City 
for the taking of his deposition and, if necessary, the 
cost of one night's hotel accommodations. 
(Transcript, pg. 116-117). 
12. On April 19, 1982, counsel for respondents was 
contacted by counsel for appellant Cowan and informed that 
the documents requested pursuant to Plaintiffs' First 
Request for Production of Documents Directed to Defendant 
David Cowan would not be produced on April 19, 1982, as 
required therein. In addition, counsel for Cowan informed 
plaintiffs' counsel that a family emergency had arisen 
necessitating Mr. Cowan' s absence from the State of Utah. 
Counsel for Cowan requested that Cowan's deposition be 
continued until Mr. Cowan could return to the State of Utah. 
Accordingly, it was agreed that Mr. Cowan's deposition would 
be continued until 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, April 27, 1982. 
(Transcript, pp. 110-111). It was also agreed that the 
documents requested pursuant to Plaintiffs' First Request 
for Production of Documents would be produced no later than 
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Friday, April 23, 1982. On April 20, 1982, a letter con-
firming the telephone conference of April 19, 1982 was 
hand-delivered to counsel for David Cowan. (See letter 
dated April 20, 1982, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 
13. On April 23, 1982, counsel for respondents 
met with counsel for appellant Cowan for the purpose of 
procuring the documents requested pursuant to Plaintiffs' 
First Request for Production of Documents Directed to 
Defendant David Cowan. At that time, respondents' counsel 
received some of the requested documents but was informed 
that Mr. Cowan had been unable to find all of the documents 
requested. The remaining documents requested pursuant to 
Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of Documents were 
not produced by Cowan until Friday, April 30, 1982. 
In addition, counsel for Cowan indicated that Mr. Cowan had 
important business matters in Idaho during the week of April 
26, 1982, and requested that the deposition of Mr. Cowan be 
continued to the following week. As an accommodation to 
counsel, respondents' counsel agreed to such an extension of 
time. Accordingly, the deposition of David Cowan was again 
continued, this time until 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, May 4, 
1982. (Transcript, pp. 114-115). 
14. During a telephone conference on April 26, 
1982, between counsel for respondents and counsel for 
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appellant Benz, it was agreed that the deposition of Peter 
Benz would be taken on May 13, 1982, at the hour of 10:00 
a.m. Accordingly, a Notice of Deposition for the taking of 
the Benz deposition was hand-delivered to counsel for Benz 
on April 27, 1982. (Transcript, pp. 112-113). 
15. On April 27, 1982, counsel for respondents 
received a certain Notice of Deposition, scheduling the 
depositions of respondents D. Scott McGregor and Eldon L. 
Richardson, II, for the afternoon of May 13, 1982. (Trans-
cript, pg. 118). 
16. On April 28, 1982, counsel for respondents 
received a Motion of Defendant Peter A. Benz for Protective 
Order and Order Compelling Discovery. Said Motion request-
ed: 
(a) That the deposition of Cowan be continued 
to May 13, 1982, or at such time as was convenient to 
all parties; 
(b) That the respondents be ordered to appear 
at their depositions scheduled for May 13, 1982; and 
(c) Alternatively, should respondents not be 
available for their depositions on. May 13, 1982, that 
they pay the costs and expenses for Benz to come to 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for the taking of their deposi-
tions. 
(Transcript, pp. 119-120). 
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17. Defendant Benz' Motion for Protective Order 
dnd Order Compelling Discovery was argued on May 3, 1982, 
be fore the Honorable Dav id B. Dee, District Judge. After 
having considered the pleadings on file, the arguments and 
representations of counsel, and being fully advised in the 
premises, Judge Dee denied Benz' Motion and ordered that all 
prior Orders of the Court be complied with by appellants. 
(Transcript, pp. 155-156). 
18. As of April 29, 1982, appellant Benz had 
neither filed an Answer to respondents' Complaint nor 
produced the documents requested pursuant to Plaintiffs' 
First Request for Production of Documents as required by 
Judge Rigtrup's Order of April 19, 1982. 
19. On May 3, 1982, Peter A. Benz filed his Answer 
to respondents' Complaint. (Transcript, pp. 152-154). Benz 
did not file the counterclaims which both he and David Cowan 
now contend are compulsory. The Answer of Peter A. Benz was 
filed more than three ( 3) months after the filing of the 
Complaint and after two orders of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, neither of which were complied with by ap-
pellant Benz. 
20. Also on May 3, 1982, appellants Peter A. 
Benz and David Cowan filed a certain Complaint against 
respondents and others in the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
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Chancery Division: Morris County Docket No. c 3221 81. 
(Attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). 
21. On or about May 4, 1982, counsel for respon-
dents received a certain Notice of Continuance of Taking of 
Depositions from counsel for Benz, continuing the deposi-
tions of D. Scott McGregor and Eldon L. Richardson, II, from 
May 13, 1982, to May 17, 1982. (Transcript, pg. 159). 
These were the very depositions for which Benz had sought an 
Order of the Third Judicial District Court on May 3, 1982, 
compelling the attendance of McGregor and Richardson. 
22. The deposition of Peter A. Benz was taken on 
May 17, 1982. At the conclusion of the deposition, Benz and 
his counsel of record advised that they were continuing 
without date the depositions of respondents on the specific 
representation that an offer of settlement would be made by 
Benz "within a reasonable time." (See Affidavit of LeRoy S. 
Axland, Transcript, pg. 182). No offer of settlement was 
subsequently received by respondents' counsel from either of 
the appellants. 
23. On or about Monday, June 21, 1982, counsel for 
respondents contacted, by telephone, counsel for appellant 
Peter A. Benz. At that time, counsel for Benz advised 
respondents' counsel that 
counsel in this proceeding. 
Axland, Transcript, p. 183). 
Benz was seeking to change 
(See Affidavit of LeRoy S. 
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24. On June 21, 1982, respondents filed a Motion 
tor Expedited Trial Setting. (Transcript, pp. 163-165). As 
set forth therein, the Motion for Expedited Trial Setting 
was made on the following grounds and for the following 
reasons: 
(a) The appellants had sought to hinder and 
delay respondents' discovery; 
( b) The filing of the New Jersey action was 
an attempt by appellants to harass and annoy respon-
dents and to obtain a favorable ruling in a forum in 
which one of the appellants, Peter A. Benz, is a member 
of the Bar; 
(c) That appellant Benz had made no offer of 
settlement as he had represented would be done during 
the taking of his deposition on May 17, 1982; and 
(d) The substitution of counsel by appellant 
Benz was an attempt to further delay the adjudication 
of respondents' claims. 
25. On or about June 23, 1982, counsel for respon-
dents received formal notice from the firm of McKay, Burton, 
Thurman & Condie of their withdrawal as counsel for Peter A. 
Benz. (Transcript, pg. 160). 
26. On or about July 1, 1982, counsel for respon-
dents received a Notice of Entry of Appearance filed by 
Merlin o. Baker, Esq., giving notice of the appearance of 
- 11 -
the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker as attorneys for 
appellant Peter A. Benz. (Transcript, p. 180). 
27. On July 7, 1982, respondents' Motion for 
Expedited Trial Setting came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. After having 
reviewed the pleadings on file and having heard the repre-
sentations and arguments of counsel, respondents' Motion was 
denied. However, Judge Croft set this matter for trial, on 
a firm first place setting, in April of 1983. (Transcript, 
p. 187). 
28. Subsequent to July 7, 1982, the appellants 
engaged in the following discovery: 
(a) On or about August 18, 1982, counsel for 
respondents received Defendant Peter A. Benz' First 
Request for Production of Documents Directed to Plain-
tiffs. (Transcript, pp. 189-191). The Response to 
Defendant Peter A. Benz' First Request for Production 
of Documents Directed to Plaintiffs was filed on 
September 23, 1982. (Transcript, pp. 192-197); and 
(b) On January 4, 1983, counsel for respon-
dents received a certain Notice of Taking Depositions 
scheduling the depositions of respodents for January 18 
and 19 , 19 8 3 . (Transcript, pp. 198-199). 
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29. On November 4, 1982, Judge Arnold M. Stein of 
tlie Superior Court of New Jersey entered a certain norder 
Staying Action on Conditionn in the action filed by Benz and 
Cowan in the New Jersey courts. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C"). 
30. On January 12, 1983, appellants Benz and Cowan 
filed a certain Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties (hereinafter 
"Motion to Amend"). (Transcript, pp. 200-237). Appellants' 
Mot ion sought to assert, for the first time, four counter-
claims against respondents McGregor and Richardson and seven 
"counterclaims" against parties not heretofore parties to 
this action. Appellants' Motion was made less than three 
months prior to the date set for trial and more than two 
months after Judge Stein's Order staying the New Jersey 
action. 
31. Appellants' Motion to Amend came on regularly 
for hearing before the Law and Motion Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, on Thursday, 
January 20, 1983. (Transcript, pp. 363-364). At the 
conclusion of said hearing, Judge Hanson took appellants' 
Motion under advisement. 
32. On or about March 2, 1983 counsel for respon-
dents and appellants were informed by a telephone call that 
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appellants' Motion to Amend had been denied. Respondents' 
counsel was asked to prepare an appropriate Order. 
33. On March 3, 1983, appellants Benz and Cowan 
filed yet another action naming as defendants D. Scott 
McGregor, Eldon L. Richardson, II, the McNeil/Mehew Group, 
Inc., Buttonwood Management Associates, Donald Remlinger, 
Peter Caruso, Guy J. Cutuli, Gus DiBiasi, Robert A. DiMizio, 
and Anthony Zero in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. C-83-1605. The 
Benz and Cowan Complaint of March 3, 1983 (Attached hereto 
as Exhibit "D"), sets forth those causes of action which 
appellants Benz and Cowan sought to join in this action 
pursuant to their Motion to Amend dated January 12, 1983, 
and which are asserted in the New Jersey action. 
34. On March 7, 1983, the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, issued the Order Denying Motion of 
Defendants Peter A. Benz and David Cowan for Leave to File 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional 
Parties. (Transcript, pp. 363-364). In addition, Judge 
Hanson entered a certain Memorandum Decision setting forth 
his reasons for the denial of appellants' Motion. 
- 14 -
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON DID NOT ABUSE 
HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED AN-
SWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND TO JOIN 
----- ADDITIONAL PARTIES 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson's Memorandum Decision of 
March 7, 1983, denying appellants' Motion to Amend, sets 
forth the grounds of the Court's decision as follows: 
An examination of the nature of the 
controversy in this matter and the 
activities of the parties up to thTS 
point in t1me, together with the fact 
that on July 7, 1982 Judge Bryant H. 
f~£!!L_£!_~his Court, following a 
special hearing, set this matter as a 
number one setting in April of 1983, 
together with the observations of the 
Court that defendants' Motion to Amend 
and to Join Additional Parties would 
raise new issues, delay the long-stand-
~t rial date, and would seriously 
prejudice the plaintiffs in having the 
matter heard as scheduled all lead the 
Court to the conclusion that the defen-
dants' Motion must be denied, even in 
the face of the long-standing rule that 
amendments are to be 1 iberally allowed 
where justice so requires. An overall 
view of the file and activities, to-
~ether with this specially set trial 
date as above-noted do not lead this 
Court to believe that the amendment 
should be allowed in that justice does 
not so require in this circumstance. A 
weighing of the "interests of justice" 
as required by the Rules of Procedure 
and taking into account and weighing 
the respective hardships of the parti-
cular parties all lead this Court to the 
- 15 -
conclusion that defendants' Motion 
should be denied, and it is so ordered. 
(Transcript, pp. 365-366) (emphasis added). 
A review of the facts of this case, together with 
the applicable case law, can only lead to the conclusion 
that Judge Hanson's Memorandum Decision and Order were fully 
justified and proper and did not constitute an abuse 
of judicial discretion. 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, gen-
erally governs the amendment of pleadings. Insofar as Rule 
15(a) is pertinent, it provides: 
[A] party may amend his pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of 
the adverse party; and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires. 
The granting or denying of a motion to amend pleadings under 
the provisions of Rule 15(a) lies within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. Westley v. Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983); Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 
2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960). This Court has recently stated 
that "[a] trial court's refusal to grant leave to amend is 
not reversible error unless the denial constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. n Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation, 
Co., No. 18203, slip op. at 2 (Utah filed May 17, 1983) 
(citations omitted). 
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In construing Rule lS(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which is identical to Utah Rule lS(a), the 
united States Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 
(1962), enumerated the following general standard to be 
employed by courts in determining whether a motion to amend 
should be granted: 
If the underlying facts or circumstances 
relied on by a [party] may be a proper 
subject of relief, he ought to be 
afforded an opportunity to test his 
claim on the merits. In the absence of 
any apparent or undeclared reason 
such as undu~delay, bad faith or 
dilato!:Y motive on the part of the 
movant;- repeated failure to cure defi-
ciencies by amendments previously 
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 
party by virtue of the allowance of the 
amendment, futility of amendment, etc. -
the leave sought should, as the rules 
require, be "freely given." 
Id. at 182 (emphasis added). 
A court considering a motion to amend must inquire 
into whether there has been undue delay, bad faith or 
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, whether the party 
opposing the amendment will be prejudiced if the amendment 
is allowed, the reasons for the movant's failing to include 
in his original pleading the material sought to be added, 
and the hardship to the moving party if leave to amend is 
denied. See, ~, 6 c. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 1487 (1971). Respondents respectfully 
submit that Judge Hanson's Order and Memorandum Decision 
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denying appellants' Motion to Amend constituted a proper 
exercise of his discretion and was correct as a matter of 
law for the following reasons: 
1. A review of the history of this lawsuit re-
veals what could only be considered a concerted attempt by 
appellants to delay adjudication of the case; 
2. The granting of appellants' Motion to Amend 
would have raised new issues and resulted in a delay of the 
long-established trial date, thereby prejudicing respon-
dents; 
3. Appellants have failed to give sufficient 
reasons justifying their failure to include in their ori-
ginal Answers those counterclaims proposed to be asserted by 
amendment; and 
4. Any hardship to appellants was caused by their 
own acts. 
A. APPELLANTS ENGAGED IN A CONCERTED EFFORT 
TO DELAY ADJUDICATION OF OF THIS ACTION 
A review of the history of this action as set 
forth in the Statement of Facts reveals what can only be 
considered a concerted attempt by appellants to delay the 
adjudication of this matter. While not wishing to belabor 
the point, respondents strongly believe that the following 
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analysis demonstrates appellants' bad faith and dilatory 
motives throughout the history of this action. 
Respondents' Complaint was filed on January 28, 
1982. Appellant David Cowan was served with the Complaint 
on January 29, 1982 at the hour of 4:35 p.m. (Transcript, 
pg. 15). Under the provisions of Rule 12 (a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Cowan should have filed his Answer to the 
Complaint on or before February 18, 1982. Appellant Cowan 
did not file his Answer to respondents' Complaint until 
March 29, 1982. (Transcript, pp. 95-100). 
Appellant Peter Benz was served with the Summons 
and Complaint in this action on February 1, 1982. (Trans-
cript, pp. 39-41). On March 3, 1982, appellant Benz filed 
his Motion to Quash Service or, in the Alternative, Motion 
to Dismiss. (Transcript, pp, 29-30). By Order of the Third 
Judicial District Court dated March 19, 1982, appellant 
Benz' Motion was denied. (Transcript, pp. 94-95). Pursuant 
to that Order of March 19, 1982, defendant Benz was given 
ten (10) days, until March 29, 1982, to file his Answer to 
the Complaint. Appellant Benz did not file his Answer on or 
before March 29, 1982. On April 19, 1982, the Third Judi-
cial District Court ordered Benz to file his Answer to 
plaintiffs' Complaint on or before April 29, 1982. (Trans-
cript, pg. 117). Appellant Benz did not do so. Appellant 
Benz did not file his Answer to the Complaint until May 3, 
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1982, five weeks after the date set by the Court's first 
order. (Transcript, pp. 152-154). 
On March 18, 1982, respondents gave notice of the 
taking of the deposition of Peter A. Benz scheduled for 
Tuesday, April 20, 1982. (Transcript, pp. 75-76). Also on 
March 18, 1982, respondents served upon counsel for appel-
lant Benz Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of 
Documents. The documents were to be produced by Benz at 
9:00 a.m. on Monday, April 19, 1982. Rather than appearing 
for his deposition and producing the documents requested, 
Benz, on April 15, 1982, four days prior to the date his 
documents were to be produced and six days prior to the date 
set for the taking of his deposition, filed a Motion for 
Extension of Time in Which to File Responsive Pleading, in 
Which to Respond to Discovery Requests, and for Protective 
Order. On April 19, 1982, the Third Judicial District Court 
ordered that Benz be granted an additional ten (10) days to 
respond to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of 
Documents and that the deposition of appellant Benz be taken 
within twenty days of the Court's Order. (Transcript, pg. 
117). Benz did not produce the documents on April 29, 1982, 
as required by the Court. 
On March 18, 1982, respondents served notice of 
the taking of the deposition of appellant David Cowan on 
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Wednesday, April 21, 1982. Cowan's deposition was twice 
continued at the request of Cowan's counsel. 
On April 27, 1982, counsel for respondents 
received a Notice of Deposition, scheduling the depositions 
of D. Scott McGregor and Eldon L. Richardson, II, for the 
afternoon of May 13, 1982. (Transcript, p. 118). On April 
28, 1982, counsel for respondents received a Motion of 
Defendant Peter A. Benz for Protective Order and Order 
Compelling Discovery. (Transcript, pp. 119-120). That 
Motion requested, inter alia, that respondents McGregor 
and Richardson be ordered to appear at the depositions 
scheduled for May 13, 1982 and that should they not be 
available for their depositions on May 13, 1982, that they 
pay the costs and expenses for Benz to come to Salt Lake 
City, Utah, for the taking of their depositions. At the 
time Benz' Motion was made, there was no indication that 
respondents would not appear for the taking of their deposi-
t ions on May 13, 1982. Benz' Motion was apparently made for 
the sole purpose of harassing and annoying respondents. 
Accordingly, on May 3, 1982, Judge David B. Dee of the Third 
Judicial District Court denied Benz' Motion for Protective 
Order and Order Compelling Discovery. 
On May 4, 1982, notwithstanding the filing of the 
meritless Motion to Compel Discovery, counsel for respon-
dents received a certain Notice of Continuance of Taking of 
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Depositions from counsel for Benz, continuing the deposi-
tions of D. Scott McGregor and Eldon L. Richardson, II, from 
May 13, 1982, to May 17, 1982. On May 17, 1982, Benz and 
his counsel of record advised that they were continuing 
without date respondents' depositions. The depositions of 
respondents were not taken by counsel for Benz until January 
of 1983, more than seven months after the date on which Benz 
sought to compel respondents' attendance by Court order. 
On May 3, 1982, defendant Peter A. Benz finally 
filed his Answer to respondents' Complaint. On May 3, 1982, 
appellants Benz and Cowan also filed their Complaint in the 
New Jersey action. Appellants admit that the complaint 
filed in the state courts of New Jersey is virtually iden-
tical to the counterclaims which appellants sought leave of 
the Third Judicial District Court to add to their Answers in 
their Motion to Amend dated January 12, 1983. (See Appel-
!ant's Brief, pp. 7-8). The only apparent purpose for the 
filing of the New Jersey action was to harass and annoy 
respondents and to force them to simultaneously litigate 
their claims in two separate forums. 
On May 17, 1982, Benz and his counsel of record 
made the representation to respondents' counsel that an 
offer of settlement would be made by Benz "within a reason-
able period of time." (Affidavit of LeRoy S. Axland, dated 
July 6, 1982, Transcript, p. 182). No offer of settlement 
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was subsequently made. On June 21, 1982, counsel for 
respondents contacted then-counsel for Benz by telephone to 
inquire as to the offer of settlement. At that time, 
counsel for Benz advised respondents' counsel that Benz was 
seeking to change Utah counsel in this proceeding. (See 
Affidavit of LeRoy S. Axland, dated July 6, 1982, Trans-
cript, p. 183). 
For these reasons, respondents filed a Motion for 
Expedited Trial Setting on June 21, 1982. Although the 
motion was subsequently denied, Judge Bryant H. Croft of 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, set this matter for trial on a firm first place 
setting in April of 1983. (Transcript, p. 187). 
Subsequent to July 7, 1982, appellants can hardly 
be said to have vigorously pursued discovery in this action. 
On the contrary, the sole discovery undertaken by appellants 
was the service of Defendant Peter A. Benz's First Request 
for Production of Documents Directed to Plaintiffs on August 
18, 1982, (Transcript, pp. 188-191), and the taking of 
respondents' depositions during January, 1983. 
On November 4, 1982, Judge Arnold M. Stein of the 
Superior Court of New Jersey entered his Order Staying 
Action on Condition in the action filed by Benz and Cowan in 
the New Jersey courts. Appellants then delayed for over two 
months, until January 12, 1983, before filing their Motion 
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to Amend. Appellants do not dispute that the granting of 
their Motion by Judge Hanson would have raised new issues 
and delayed the trial date. Indeed, appellants state: 
•Appellants concede that the granting of the Motion for 
Leave to File an Amended Answer both would have raised new 
issues and delayed the trial date.• (Appellants' Brief, pp. 
21-22). 
Given the history of this litigation, it was not 
unreasonable for Judge Hanson to conclude that appellants' 
Motion to Amend was made in bad faith and with a dilatory 
motive. Indeed, Judge Hanson so found when he stated: 
An overall view of the file and acti-
vities, together with the specially set 
trial date as above-noted do not lead 
this Court to believe that the amendment 
should be allowed in that justice does 
not so require in this circumstance. 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 2, Transcript, p. 366). 
The record in this case amply supports a deter-
mination by Judge Hanson that appellants' Motion to Amend 
was made in bad faith and with a dilatory motive. Accord-
ingly, Judge Hanson's denial of appellants' Motion to Amend 
was not an abuse of discretion and must be affirmed. 
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B. THE GRANTING OF APPELLANTS' MOTION TO 
AMEND WOULD HAVE RAISED NEW ISSUES 
AND-RES-ULTED-INADELAYOFTHETRIAL 
DATE THEREBY PREJUDICING RESPONDENTS 
Appellants have conceded that the granting of 
their Motion to Amend would have raised new issues and 
delayed the trial date. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 21-22). 
Appellants further state that • [s]ome inconvenience may have 
been imposed upon plaintiffs if the time for adjudicating 
their claims had been delayed." (Appellants' Brief, p. 7). 
Appellants argue, however, that that inconvenience is 
"minimal• when compared to the prejudice that appellants 
would suffer if their compulsory counterclaims were not 
allowed to be tried in this case. (Appellants' Brief, 
p. 7). 
While such an argument may have some surface 
appeal, it ignores a long line of cases holding that it 
is the denial of a speedy and inexpensive adjudication of 
the non-movant' s claims to which the courts look in deter-
mining whether the party opposing the motion to amend is 
prejudiced. The "prejudice" of a party opposing a Motion to 
Amend "is not that occasioned by defeat on the merits, but 
rather the inconvenience and delay suffered when the amend-
ment raises new issues or inserts new parties into the 
litigation." Romo v. Reyes, 26 Ariz. App. 374, 548 P.2d 
1186, 1188 (1976). See also Williams v. United States, 405 
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F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1968); Kuris v. Pepper Poultry Company, 
Inc., 2 F.R.D. 361, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). 
A review of appellants' proposed counterclaim 
shows that the issues raised therein go far beyond the 
enforceability of the Compensation Agreement of December 3, 
1981. If Judge Hanson had granted appellants' Motion, it 
would have been necessary to redepose the appellants, 
particularly with respect to the issues set forth in the 
Fourth through Seventh Counts of the proposed counterclaim. 
Additional discovery, unnecessary for the matter to have 
gone to trial as scheduled on the issues as framed by 
respondents' Complaint, would need to have been taken. 
Specifically, the depositions of Donald Remlinger and all 
persons associated with BMC Acquisition Corporation would 
have needed to have been taken. Under such circumstances, 
the courts have not hesitated to deny eleventh-hour motions 
to amend. 
In Idaho First National Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 
256, 596 P.2d 429 (1979), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the 
decision of a trial court in denying defendants' motion to 
amend their answer to join a third-party defendant. The 
amendment was proposed approximately two years after the 
filing of the complaint and five months prior to the date 
set for trial. 
stated: 
In so holding, the Idaho Supreme Court 
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The trial court stated that "the grant-
ing of defendants' motion at this late 
stage of the proceedings would compli-
cate and delay the principal action and 
impose an unwarranted hardship on 
plaintiff ... "We agree with the trial 
court's analysis of the consequences of 
allowing the amendment and therefore 
hold that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying appellants' 
motion to amend their complaint [sic] to 
add a third party defendant. 
596 P.2d at 434 (emphasis added). 
In Morgan Brothers, Inc. v. Haskell Corporation, 
Inc., 24 wash. App. 773, 604 P.2d 1294 (1979), the washing-
ton Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying a motion to amend five weeks 
before trial absent a showing of why a third-party defendant 
was not brought in prior to such time and where the amend-
ment would have delayed the trial of the case. See also 
Cherokee National Life Insurance Company v. Coastal Bank of 
Georgia, 238 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. 1977) (the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying leave to file third-party 
complaint where such leave was sought more than nine months 
after suit was commenced); Cowman v. Lavine, 234 N.W.2d 114 
(Iowa 1975) (the denial by the trial court of defendants' 
mot ion to amend was not an abuse of discretion where the 
motion was not filed until nine months after suit was 
commenced and was made subsequent to the taking of deposi-
t ions, the f i 1 ing of an answer, and a pre-trial conference 
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at which a specific trial date was set); Hogue v. Superior 
Utilities, 53 N.M. 452, 210 P.2d 938 (1949) (where plain-
tiffs' motion to join additional party as a defendant was 
not made until late in the case, there was not an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the 
motion). 
In DeBry v. Transamerica Corporation, 601 F.2d 480 
(10th Cir. 1979), plaintiffs sought damages from defendant 
Transamerica Corporation for alleged fraud in a transaction 
involving an exchange of stock. After the filing of two 
amended Complaints, plaintiffs moved again, eighteen months 
after the filing of their original Complaint and three 
months prior to trial, to again amend their Complaint. The 
proposed Third Amended Complaint alleged new theories of 
recovery and, if granted, would possibly have resulted in a 
postponement of the trial. The United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, Central Division, the Honorable 
Aldon J. Anderson presiding, denied Plaintiffs' Motion to 
File Third Amended Complaint. The case thereafter proceeded 
to trial and a jury verdict was returned in favor of defen-
dant Transamerica. Thereafter, plaintiffs appealed, al-
leging, inter alia, error by the trial court in denying 
plaintiffs' Motion to Amend. In upholding the decision of 
the trial court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
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plaintiffs' Motion and that good reason existed for the 
denial. In so holding, the Court stated: 
First, the case had been on file for 
eighteen months. The trial setting was 
three months off. The tendered com-
plaint brought in new concepts and 
theories which created a hazard that 
postponement of trial would be neces-
sary. The court reasoned that: 
The interest of fairness and 
justice to both parties are 
best served at this st.age of 
the case by avoiding the 
additional discovery and trial 
preparation which the differ-
ent causes of action would 
require. The additional 
causes of action which 
the plaintiffs seek to include 
by this amendment do not 
represent new areas of the law 
that could not have been 
developed further and incorpo-
rated in this cause of 
action at an.earlier date. 
It would thus appear that the trial 
court was of the opinion that there had 
been ample time for the plaintiffs to 
develop the concepts and theories 
embodied in the amended complaint since 
they did not represent new areas of the 
law. It cannot be said, therefore, that 
the trial court acted in an unreasonable 
or arbitrary manner. 
601 F.2d at 492. 
In the case at bar, granting
0
appellants' Motion to 
Amend would have required additional extensive discovery and 
preparation and greatly added to the trial time involved to 
the detriment of a speedy resolution of the case, thereby 
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unduly prejudicing respondents. Thus, Judge Hanson's Order 
and Memorandum Decision of March 7, 1983, were proper, did 
not constitute an abuse of judicial discretion and must be 
affirmed. 
C. APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO JUSTIFY THEIR 
FAILURE TO ASSERT THEIR COUNTERCLAIMS 
UPON THE FILING OF THEIR ANSWERS 
Appellants argue that the prejudice to respondents 
because of a postponement of the trial date "is minimal 
compared to the permanent prejudice sustained by the defen-
dants if their compulsory counterclaims are not allowed to 
be tried in this action." (Appellants' Brief, p. 7). The 
fact that the amendments that appellants sought were for the 
purpose of asserting compulsory counterclaims does not, 
however, ipso facto justify allowing the amendment, parti-
cularly when it would result in a delay of the long-est ab-
lished trial date. 
Rule 13(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim 
any claim which at the time of serving 
the pleading the pleader has against any 
opposing party, if it arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party's 
claim . 
(Emphasis added). 
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On March 29, 1982, the date upon which appellant 
Cowan filed his Answer, and on May 3, 1982, the date upon 
which appellant Benz filed his Answer, the appellants knew 
of, and could have asserted, the claims which formed the 
basis of their Motion to Amend dated January 12, 1983. This 
is conclusively shown by reason of the fact that on May 3, 
1982, more than eight months prior to their Motion to Amend, 
appellants filed their New Jersey action asserting essen-
tially the very claims which they sought to add to this 
action by amendment. Having failed to properly assert their 
compulsory counterclaims when they filed their Answers, 
appellants could seek to assert their counterclaims only 
under the provisions of Rule 13(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 13(e) provides: 
When a pleader fails to set up a coun-
terclaim through oversight, inadver-
tence, or excusable neglect, or when 
justice requires, he may by leave of 
court set up the counterclaim by 
amendment. 
Respondents respectfully submit that appellants 
failed before the District Court, and have failed before 
this Court, to justify their failure to assert the counter-
claims and to join the additional parties upon the filing of 
their original Answers. A review of the history of this 
litigation to date, as extensively set forth above, can only 
lead to the conclusion that appellants sought to gain a 
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strategic advantage in this litigation by filing the paral-
lel action in the state courts of New Jersey rather than 
asserting their counterclaims in the instant case. Having 
been ordered by the New Jersey court to attempt to seek 
relief in this action, appellants waited more than two 
months before belatedly petitioning the Third Judicial 
District Court to allow their proposed counterclaims and 
other amendments. Such action on the part of the appellants 
does not constitute oversight, inadvertence or excusable 
neglect. 
Appellants Benz and Cowan agree that the counter-
claims which they sought to assert in their Motion to Amend 
are the same that they asserted in their New Jersey action. 
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 7-8). The courts have consistently 
denied leave to amend when the moving party knew about the 
facts on which the proposed amendment was based but omitted 
the necessary allegations from the original pleading. 
See Larson v. Arnold E. Verdi Trucking, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 377 
(E.D. Pa. 1961); Singer Manufacturing Company v. Shepard, 13 
F.R.D. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Kuris v. Pepper Poultry Company, 
Inc., 2 F.R.D. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) Cf. Dow Corning Corpora-
tion v. General Electric Company, 461 F. Supp. 519 (N.D.N.Y. 
1978). 
In Ralston-Purina Company v. Bertie, 541 F.2d 1363 
(9th Cir. 1976), the United States Court of Appeals for the 
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Ninth Circuit upheld an order of the trial court denying 
defendants' motion for leave to assert an omitted compulsory 
counterclaim. The Court found no abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court where defendants' motion contained 
no allegations of newly discovered evidence establishing, 
for the first time, that they had a compulsory counterclaim, 
and where the motion was made six months after the filing of 
the answer and two months after a pre-trial conference. 
Indeed, this Court, in Westley v. Farmer's Insur-
ance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983), held that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a plaintiff's 
motion to amend his complaint where the amendment would have 
delayed the trial and the substance of plaintiff's new 
allegation was known a full year earlier. In Westley, 
plaintiff, on April 23, 1980, filed a two count complaint. 
In the first count, plaintiff alleged that Farmer's had 
breached its contract with him. In the second count, 
plaintiff alleged that Farmer's had defamed him. De po-
sitions were taken and in November, 1981, Farmer's moved for 
summary judgment on both counts. Shortly thereafter, 
plaintiff retained new counsel who immediately moved for a 
continuance of the trial scheduled for January 13, 1982. 
Plaintiff also moved to amend his complaint to include an 
allegation that Farmer's had maliciously removed his name 
from the list of Farmer's Insurance agents in the telephone 
- 33 -
directory. The trial court denied plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend. 
On appeal, plaintiff Westley contended that the 
trial court erred in not allowing him to amend his com-
plaint. In upholding the decision of the lower court, this 
Court stated: 
On the facts presented, we are not 
convinced that the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to grant the 
requested leave to amend. An amendment 
would certainly have delayed the trial 
and the substance of plaintiff's new 
allegation was known a full year earlier 
when plaintiff discussed it in his 
deposition. 
Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, as in Westley, there is no 
dispute that had the Third Judicial District Court granted 
appellants' Motion to Amend it would "certainly have delayed 
the trial." Moreover, the factual basis of appellants' 
proposed counterclaims against McGregor and Richardson were 
known to appellants at least as of May 3, 1982, more than 
eight months earlier, when appellants filed their New Jersey 
action. As in Westley, the present case does not involve an 
abuse of discretion i~ Judge Timothy R. Hanson's denial of 
appellants' Motion to Amend. 
While it is not altogether clear, appellants 
apparently argue that the reason they did not attempt to 
assert their compulsory counterclaims prior to January of 
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1983 is that by so doing appellant Benz would have waived 
his objection to the Third Judicial District Court's asser-
tion of in personam jurisdiction over him. This argument is 
without merit for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact 
that there is no question that the Third Judicial District 
Court had in personam jurisdiction over the person of 
appellant Cowan. Cowan' s failure to assert the compulsory 
counterclaims at an earlier date is entirely unjustified. 
Second, with respect to appellant Benz, the assertion of a 
compulsory counterclaim does not waive an objection to the 
jurisdiction of a court. Professors Wright and Miller in 
their treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure state: 
The general rule is that the assertion 
of a compulsory counterclaim by defen-
dant does not constitute a waiver of any 
objections he might have to the court's 
personal jurisdiction over him or its 
venue . 
6 c. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
s 1409 (1971). See also Dragor Shipping Corporation v. 
Union Tank Car Company, 378 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1967) 
("[S]ince ... a party has no alternative but to submit his 
compulsory counterclaim against an opposing party, or lose 
it, his act in asserting it does not constitute a waiver of 
any jurisdictional defense he previously or concurrently 
asserts."); Hasse v. American Photograph Corporation, 299 
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F.2d 666, 669 (10th Cir. 1962); Hunt v. BP Exploration 
Company (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 895-896 (N.D. Texas 
1980); Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Thompson, 80 F. 
Supp. 570, 574 (E.D. Mo. 1948). 
Because appellants did not and could not show 
oversight, inadvertence or excusable neglect in failing 
to file their proposed counterclaims prior to January, 1983, 
as required by Rule 13(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, coupled with the fact that appellants knew about the 
"facts" on which their proposed counterclaims were based no 
later than May 3, 1982, Judge Timothy R. Hanson correctly 
denied appellants' Motion to Amend. This Honorable Court 
must therefore find, as a matter of law, that Judge Hanson 
did not abuse his discretion in denying appellants' Motion 
to Amend. 
D. ANY PREJUDICE TO APPELLANTS HAS BEEN 
CAUSED BY THEIR OWN ACTS 
Appellants argue that because the counterclaims 
they sought to assert against respondents were compulsory 
counterclaims, Judge Hanson abused his discretion in denying 
their Motion to Amend. What appellants fail to candidly 
acknowledge, however, is that their proposed counterclaims 
were compulsory on March 29, 1982, the date appellant 
Cowan filed his Answer in the instant action, and were 
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likewise compulsory on May 3, 1982, the date appellant Benz 
filed his Answer to respondents' Complaint. Rather than 
filing their compulsory counterclaims, appellants sought to 
gain a strategic advantage by bringing a separate action in 
the state courts of New Jersey in which appellant Benz is a 
member of the Bar. 
The New Jersey action was subsequently stayed on 
November 4, 1982. The stay of the New Jersey action did 
not, however, miraculously transform the claims asserted by 
the appellants in the New Jersey action into compulsory 
counterclaims which had to be asserted in the Utah action. 
The counterclaims were compulsory counterclaims on March 29, 
1982, May 3, 1982 and in January, 1983. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the stay of the New 
Jersey proceedings on November 4, 1982, appellants did not 
seek to amend their Answers in the instant case until 
January 12, 1983, over two months after the stay of the New 
Jersey proceedings, thus necessitating a delay of the trial 
of this action if their Motion had been granted. The 
problems which appellants face in the instant action are 
problems solely of their own making. They have repeatedly 
and consistently attempted to delay discovery in this 
act ion, as well as to delay the trial date. Judge Hanson 
correctly held, based on the record in this case, that 
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appellants' Motion to Amend should be denied. This Court 
should likewise deny appellants' Appeal and affirm the Order 
and Memorandum Decision dated March 7, 1983. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS IN THE NEW JERSEY 
ACTION SHOULD NOT ESTOP THEM FROM 
oi>P0s!N"G-APPELLANTS1 -M"6Trm:lroRI:E"AvET6 
FILE AN AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
AND TO JOIN ADDITIONAL PARTIES 
Appellants argue that by reason of the representa-
tions made by respondents to the New Jersey court regarding 
the staying of the New Jersey action, respondents should 
have been estopped to argue that the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, should not allow 
appellants' Motion to Amend. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 7-10). 
This argument is made without the citation of any authority 
and is based solely upon the arguments made by respondents 
in the New Jersey action. 
The Brief in Support of Motion to Stay on Behalf 
of Eldon L. Richardson, II, D. Scott McGregor, Donald 
Remlinger and McNeil/Mehew Group, Inc. was filed in the New 
Jersey action on July 16, 1982. At the time the arguments 
set forth therein were made, respondents in good faith 
believed that the New Jersey action should have been stayed 
and that parallel litigation in two disparate forms was 
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1inwise, constituted a waste of judicial resources and was 
inconvenient to the parties. Respondents further believed 
that for the New Jersey action to go forward would cause 
unnecessary duplication of discovery, litigation, and 
constitute annoyance and harassment of the respondents. If 
appellants had done as they should have done - filed their 
compulsory counterclaims when they filed their Answers in 
the instant case - the New Jersey action would not have been 
brought in the first instance. Respondents were fully 
justiifed in opposing appellants' Motion to Amend. 
Appellants Cowan and Benz consciously chose a 
litigation strategy of vexation and harassment in bringing 
their New Jersey action. When the New Jersey action was 
stayed, appellants belatedly petitioned the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to allow 
them to assert claims which should have been asserted in 
March and May of 1982. When the lower court refused to 
allow appellants' Motion to Amend, appellants claim that 
decision to be an abuse of discretion and appeal to this 
Court to rescue them from a situation of their own making. 
Neither the law nor any known concept of "justice" requires 
this Court to untie appellants' Gordian knot. 
The Order and Memorandum Decision of March 7, 
1983, entered by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the 
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Third Judicial District Court nf Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, must be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court must 
affirm the Order and Memorandum Decision of the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying appellants' Motion 
for Leave to File an Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to 
Join Additional Parties. 
DATED this !id day of September, 1983. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
LeROY s / AXLAND, Esq. 
SEN, Esq. 
for Respondents 
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of the foregoing Respondents' Brief were hand-delivered this 
~day of September, 1983 to: 
Merlin 0. Baker, Esq. 
John A. Adams, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1996 
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SUITTER, AXLAND & ARMSTRONG 
;; •111M5T•0 .. G 
••' ~ ......... !to .. ..J'" 
.,: I .. •OGt 
SE:VENTH F'LOOR 
CLARK L.£.AMl~G OF'F'ICE CE.NTC.R 
175 SOUTl-1 WEST TEMPL.E 
SALT LAKE C1TY, UTA ... 64101 
TELEPHONE l801) 532·?300 
~ARK CITY 0,.,.ICC 
PARM. ME.ADOY. 5 PLAZA 
SUITE C-200 
•(- .., ..... 5, ... MAIL.ING .AOOR.E.SS. 
PAi::tl( CITY, UTA;... e•oeo 
18011 6•9-•000 "<'~r. ~c~~:::y P 0 BOX 1168, SALi ~KE CITY, UTAM S~llO 
CABLE AOORESS. SAX!-AW 
TE!..ECOPIER (801) 532-?355 
'C'" i"'<UNTCJt 
,, . '"'utrNCP: 
. {~ E TTLt:• 
., • 5~1rr1NOTON 
•O ~. A!>.IOCRSO.,, 
.,u w i-;o,..csi A:;cril 20, 1982 
, ,., (G•N 
,<• ~ ~ [ N N C:J'I' 
E.l'u'JD DELIVERED 
Bruce Findlay, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNEL~ 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: D--Scott McGregor, et al. v. Peter A. 
Benz, et al. 
Dear Bruce: 
The purpose of this letter is to confirn the substance 
of our telephone conference of Monday, April 19, 1982. At 
t:'1at time you informed me that the documents requested pur-
suant to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of Docu-
ments Directed to Defendant David Cowan were not available 
for inspection and copying on April 19, 1982, as required by 
said Request. You also inforr.-.ed me that it was unlikely 
t!"lat Mr. Cowan would be available for the taking of his 
deposition on April 21, 1982, pursuant to the Notice of 
Deposi~ion dated March 19, 1982. 
Rather than go through the time and expense of filing 
a Motion to Compel Discovery, it was agreed that you would 
provide all documents requested pursu~~t to the Request 
for Production of Documents dated March 19, 1982, at 10:00 
a.m. on Friday, April 23, 1982. You further agreed to make 
yo'.lr client, Mr. Cowan, available for the taking of his 
deposition at 10:00 a.rn. o~ Tuesday, April 27, 1982. 
Accordingly, you will find enclosed a copy bf a ~otice of 
Continuance of Deposition, =ontinuing the deposition of 
David Cowan u:-itil 10:00 a.r:-. on April 27, 1982. 
I trust that all docur..ents will be produced on Friday, 
April 2 3, and that Mr. Cowa...-i will present himself for the 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Bruce Findlay, Esq. 
J..;nll 20, 1982 
Page two 
taking of his depositon on April 27. Should you have any 
questions or concerns, please feel free to contact ~eat any 
time. 
JMP.:cc 
Enclosure 
Very truly yours, 
& HANSON 
\..::. 
... 
LASSER. HCiC"HMAN u11e>.-11c. r..11C>Yf11J ANr'I i<IJSll.!~.; 
A Pr-ofession11 Corporation 
200 Executive Drive 
. . ·~·. ) 
j 
·. i 
West Orange, New Jersey 0?052 
(20i) i31·9000 c - ? 2 ~ 
Attor-neys for Plaintiff ~ - - ,.. ~ ."( . ... 
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JE~SEY 
CHANCERY DIVISION: MORRIS COUt"TY 
DOCKET NO. 
PETER A. BENZ Ind 
DAVID COWAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
ELDON L. RICHARDSON, 111; 
D. SCOTT McGREGOR; 
DONALD REMLINGER; 
McNEIL/MEHEW GROUP 1 INC., 
1 Utah corpor1tion; and 
BMC ACQUISITION CORPORATION, 
a New York corpor-1tlon, d/b/a 
BUTTONWOOD MANAGEMENT CO., 
Defendants. 
Civil Action 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs, PETER A. BENZ, having his principal place of 
business at 8 Court Str-eet, Morristown, New Jersey, and DAVID COWAN, 
having his principal place of business at 140 West 90'th South, Sindy, 
Utah, by w1y of complaint ag1inst defend1nu, say: 
EXHIBIT "B" 
FIRST COUNT 
1. Pla1ntltt Peter A. Benz, ("Benz") Is 1 resident oft.he 
Sute of New Jersey in the business, 1mong other things, of 1rr1nging 
sources of funding for various fin1ncial ind business ventures. 
z. Plaintiff David Cowan ("Cowin") is 1 resident of the Stlte 
o~ Utah and is in business, 1mong other things, 11 1 fin1nci1I broker 
1r,o real es Ute developer. 
3. De~enc1nts ~ldon L. Rich1rdson, Ill, ("Rich1rdson") 1nd 
Sec:: McGregor, ( "MrGregor") ire ,.esidents of the State o~ Ut1h. 
4. Defend1!"lt Donald Remlinge,., ( 'Remlinge,.") is 1 resident 
o~ tne Sti:t of Ne .. Jersey, ,.esiding at 6,.ig1de Hill Road, Mo,.ris Town• 
ship, New Je,.sey. 
5. Defend1rt McNeil/Mehe .. Gr-t>up, Inc:. ("McNeil/Mel'lew") is, 
er. in~c,.mation and belief, a Utah co,.poration with p,.incip1I places of 
business in Utah and Ne,. Yorlc Defe'"ldants Rich1rdson, McG,.ego,. 1nd 
Remlinge,. ire, on info,.m1tion and belief, officers, p,.incip1ls 1nd/or 
contr-ol I ing shar-eholders of McNei l/Mel'lew. 
6. Defendant BMC Acquisition Corporation, d/b/a Buttonwood 
Management Co., ("6unonwood") is, on infor-mation 1nd belief, I New 
Yor-. cor-poration of which defendant Remlinger is, also on info~tion 
anc bel 1ef, an officer, pr-incipal and/or contr-tllling shareholder. 
7. Sometime in October or November i981, Ricl'lar-dson 1nd 
McGregor 1ppl'"tlached Cowan concerning possible sour-ces of funding for 
1 proposed business ventur-e. 
·Z-
B. In lite November 1981 Cowan c:.onucted Benz, a business 
acqu1inunce, c:.oncerning the plans of Rich1rdson and McGregor. Benz 
lndi~ted ~1t he might be Interested In Investing himself and might also 
be 1ble to obUin other investors. 
9. Cowan relayed this information to Richl!'"dson and McG,.egor, 
who expl"essed their intel"est in meeting with, and doing business with, 
Senz in the State of New Jel"sey. 
10. On Novembe!'" 24, 1981, Remlinger and other rei=ll"esentives 
of sunonwood met with Senz and Cowan at Canoe Brook Country Club, 
Summit, New Jersey, to discuss all aspects of a proposal where!:ly 
Bunonwood would invest in the business ventul"e in c;uestion. 
11. On or about December 3, 1981, Richardson and McGregol" 
met with Senz and Cowan at Benz's offices in Mol"l'"istcwn, New Jersey. 
At that meeting Senz advised Richll"dson and McGl"egor that he had 
interested two potential investment Ql"Oups in participating in the pro· 
posed business venture. 
12. The first of these groups involved West Bridge Street 
Corporation, a New Jersey corporation of which Senz is pr-esident and 
principal shal"eholder. Under the terms of ~is al"l"angement West Bridge 
Stl"eet Corpor11tion would enter into a joint ventul"e with Mc:Neil/Mehew, 
1 c:.orporation to be formed with Richardson and McGl"egol" as the antici· 
pated pl"incipals. The terms of this ll"rangement were embodied in ~e 
Lener of intent duly executed ~at day, a true c:.opy of wl"lich is attached 
hel"eto as Exhibit 1 and incorpol"ated by reference her-ein. 
13. The ncond Ql"QUP contacted by Benz principally involved 
Fiemlin;er and/or Buttonwood. Benz and Cowan expressly conditioned 
the arran;inQ of any meetinQ with Remlin;er upon the a;reement of 
Richardson and McGregor, in advance, that In the event Richardson and 
MrGregor and/or McNeil/Mehew entered Into an agreement with Remlin;er 
and/or Buttonwood, Benz and Cowan would receive as compensation for 
their efforts $250,000 in cash and a fifteen percent (15%) interest in 
any company formed. Richardson end McGregor expressly agreed to 
these conditions. 
14. On that same day, while still In New Jersey, Benz, Cowan, 
Richardson ;;nc McGre;or entered into 21 wrinen egreement embodying 
the terms set forth above. A true copy of this agreement is atUched 
hereto as Exhibit 2 and in~r;:>orated by refel"'enc.e hel"'ein. 
15. On December 3, 1981, the meeting with Remlinger was 
held as scheduled. Remlinger at all relevant times had notice of the 
tel"'ms of the a;reement atuched hereto as Exhibit z. 
16. Immediately followinQ the meetinQ Richardson and McGregor 
!"'epresented to Benz and Cowan that they were not interested in entering 
into an arran;ement with Remlinger and would instead pursue the terms 
of the letter of intent atuched hel"'eto as Exhibit 1. 
17. Notwithsundin; such l"'epl"'esentation, Richardson and 
McGregor subsequently, without notice tc plaintiffs, entel"'ed into an 
a!"'!"'angement with RemllnQe!"' and/or Buttonwood Co. pursuant to which, 
on information and belief, all pal"'ties became principals In Mc:Neil/Mehew. 
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is. Notwlthsunding suc:h arrangements defendants have failed 
1nd refused to comply with the agreement attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 
ihe moneury value of the is percent share In the venn.ire ls Incapable 
of calculation. 
i9. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. 
WHEREFORE plaintiffs demand judgment against all defendants: 
i. For specific: performance of the agreemen't atuc:hed here~o 
u Exhibit 2. 
2. For compensatory and punitive damages. 
3. For ~sts of suit. 
4. For suc:h othe~ relief as the Court deems just a:-id pr:;ar. 
SECOND COUNi 
1. The allegations of the First Count are repeated as if set 
forth at length herein. 
2. As a result of the aforementioned conduct defendants have 
been, and will continue to be, unjustly enriched at the expense of plain· 
tiffs. 
3. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. 
WHEREFORE plaintiffs demAnd judgment against all defendants: 
i . For the imposition of 1 c:onstruc:tive trust on any and all 
profits earned by defendants pursuant to the arrangement among them. 
2. For an accounting. 
3. For costs of suit. 
4. For suc:h other relief as the Court deems Just and p~per. 
THIRD COUNT 
i. The allegations of the Fll"st and Second Counts •re r-epeated 
u If set for-th at length hel"ein. 
2. The actions of Remllnge,. and Buttonwood rn1liciously 1nd 
without justification caused Richal"dson and McGregcr to bre•ch the 
ag,.eement with plaintiffs attached hereto IS Exhibit 2. 
3. Plaintiffs wculd have eal"ned substantial profits from the 
perfcl"mance of the afo,.ementioned aQ,.eement. 
WHE.REi=ORE plaintiffs dema:"ld judgmen-: as;Ji:'ls: C!fe:-:::2r.ts 
Remlinge,. and Buttonwood: 
1. Fol" compensatol"y and punitive damages. 
2. Fol" costs of suit. 
3. Fo,. such othel" relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
FOURTH COUNT 
1. The allegations of the First, Second and Third Counts are 
repeated as if set forth at length hel"ein. 
2. Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of pr-ospective 
economic advanuge from their participation in eithel" the 1rr1ngernent 
atUched hereto as Exhibit 1 or the al"rangement atuched hereto as 
Exhibit 2. 
3. The actions of defendants hel"ein jointly and severally 
intel"fel"ed, maliciously and without justification, with plaintiffs' reason-
able expectations of prospective economic advantage. 
WHEREFORE plaintiffs demand judgment against •II defendants: 
1 . Fol" compensatory •nd punitive d1m1ges. 
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2. For c.osts of suit. 
3. For suc:h other r-elief u the Cour-t deems just ind proper. 
DAIE.;:): :..;:=i! 30, 1982 
P16E E 
LASSER, HOCHMAN, MARCUS, 
GURYAN AND KUSKIN 
A ""s:::1" :ntlff• ·~~ BY: . ') f&V 
SHE.?P~RD A. GURUN 
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/i 
PITNEY. H•R01N. K11>1> £. Szuc..i 
1e3 MA0150N AVENUE: 
P o eox 2ooeR 
MOICPRtSTOWN N .J 07980 
12011 2e7-3333 
€1 LED 
NOV 5 i982 
.AIU>IOlD Al. STf:N J.1 
cu 0RIGllJ41. FILED WITH c. 
. AA O~ THE SUP~Olt COURT 
ATTO,..,.<•s F'o• Defendants 
Eldon L. Richardson, II, 
D. Scott McGregor, Donald ·' 
Remlinger and McNeil/Mehew Group, Inc. I ! 
. ' 
PETER.A. BENZ and 
DAVID COWAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
ELDON L. RICHARDSON, II: 
D. SCOTT McGREGOR; DONALD 
REMLINGER; McNEIL/MEHEW GROUP, 
INC., a Utah corporation; and 
BMC ACQUISITION CORPORATION, a 
New York corporation, d/b/a 
BUTTONWOOD MANAGEMENT CO., 
Defendants. 
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 
CHANCERY DIVISION - MORRIS COUNTY 
DOCKET NO. C-3221-Bl 
Civil Action 
ORDER STAYING ACTION 
ON CONDITION._, ;.~ ':: ... -t:_ i .WAS1 .. I 
This matter having been opened to the Court by Pitney, 
Hardin·, Kipp & Szuch, attorneys for defendants Eldon L. 
Richardson, II, D. Scott McGregor, Donald Remlinger and McNeil/ 
Mehew Group, Inc. (Frederick L. Whitmer, Esq. appearing), and on 
EXHIBIT "C" 
the motion of Carl M. Kuntz, attorney for defendant BMC Acquisi-
tion Corporation (Michael E. Greene, Esq., of counsel, appearing)i 
and in the present of Lasser, Hochman, Marcus, Guryan and Kuskin' 
attorneys for plaintiffs Peter A. Benz and David Cowan (Sheppard 
A. Guryan, Esq. appearing), and for the reasons set forth on the 
record October 22, 1982, and good cause otherwise appearing, 
IT IS on this 'f '/1. day of Ju...,_ .(~v..J , 1982 
ORDERED that this action be and the same hereby is 
stayed as to all proceedings pending the disposition~of an action 
in the courts of the State of Utah entitled D. Scott McGregor and 
Eldon L. Richardson, II v. Peter A. Benz and David Cowan, Civil 
No. 382-727, on condition that Donald Remlinger not contest the 
exercise of jurisdiction over him by the courts of Utah in a~y 
claim asserted by the defendants here and arisi-ng out of the 
same transactions and occurrences in issue in this or that action 
and 
- ·_ ;~· .. ; .. :i.;~,~~~ 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of BMC Acquisitio 
Corporation and Buttonwood Management Co. to dismiss this action 
for lack of in personam jurisdiction shall also be stayed; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event the defendants 
I in the Utah action assert a claim naming as a defendant there any 
1: of the defendants named here over whom ~he Utah court determines 
Ji it has no @!:: pe;sona111 jurisdiction, leave is given to any party 
!I on notice in accordance with the Rules Governing the Courts of 
1: 
I 
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i 
the State of Ne~ Jersey to move to dissolve the stay granted 
herein for good cause shown, provided, however, that nothing 
in this Order shall be deemed to permit any party automatically 
to dissolve this stay. 
PAPERS CONSIDERED: 
Notice of Motion 
Movant's Affidavits 
Movant's Brief 
Answering Affidavits 
Answering Brief 
Cross-Motion 
Movant's Reply 
Other 
ARNOLD M. STEIN 1 J.S.C. 
' \ l ~ 
'lH 
MERLIN o. BAKER and 
JOHN A. ADAMS of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Peter A. Benz 
and David Cowan 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1996 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
----00000----
PETER A. BENZ and DAVID COWAN, 
Plaintiffs, COMPLAINT 
v. 
D. SCOTT McGREGOR, ELDON L. 
RICHARDSON, II, THE McNEIL/MEBEW 
GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation; 
BUTTONWOOD MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, 
a New York general partnership; 
DONALD REMLINGER; PETER CARUSO; 
GUY J. CUTULI: GUS DI BIASI; 
ROBERT A. DI MIZIO; and ANTHONY 
ZERO; 
Civil No. ~ - '?3-1q. ce;-
Defendants. 
----ooOoo----
Plaintiffs, Peter A. Benz and David Cowan, for their 
Complaint against the defendants, allege as follows: 
EXHIBIT "D" 
,\[\ 
( 
FIRST COUNT 
1. Plaintiff Peter A. Benz ("Benz"), is a resident of 
the State of New Jersey who is in the business, among other 
things, of arranging sources of funding for various financial and 
business ventures. 
2. Plaintiff David Cowan ("Cowan"), is a resident of the 
State of Utah and is in business, among other things, as a 
financial broker and real estate developer. 
3. Defendants Eldon L. Richardson, II ("Richardson"), and 
D. Scott MC'Gregor ("MC'Gregor"), are residents of the State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Donald Remlinger ("Remlinger"), 
is a resident of the State of New Jersey, residing at Brigade Hill 
Road, Morris Township, New Jersey. 
5. Defendant The McNeil/Mehew Group, Inc. ("McNeil/Mehew") 
is a Utah corporation with principal places of business in Utah and 
New York. Defendants Richardson, MC'Gregor, Peter Caruso ("Caruso") 
and Remlinger are officers, directors, principals and/or 
controlling shareholders of McNeil/Mehew. 
6. Defendant Buttonwood Management Associates 
("Buttonwood") is a New York general partnership, of which 
defendant Remlinger is also an agent, employee and/or officer. 
7. Defendants Caruso, Guy J. Cutuli ("Cutuli"), Gus Di 
Biasi ("Di Biasi"), Robert A. Di Mizio ("Di Mizio"), and Anthony 
Zero ("Zero"), are not residents of the State of Utah but each is a 
-2-
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general partner of Buttonwood Management Associates, a New York 
general partnership. 
8. This Court has jurisdiction over the non-resident 
defendants Buttonwood, Remlinger, Caruso, Cutuli, Di Biasi, Di 
Mizio and zero, pursuant to the provisions of the Utah long-arm 
statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24. 
9. Sometime in October or November 1981, Richardson and 
McGregor approached Cowan concerning possible sources of funding 
for a proposed business venture. 
10. In late November, 1981 Cowan contacted Benz, a 
business acquaintance, concerning the plans of Richardson and 
McGregor. Benz indicated that he might be interested in investing 
himself and might also be able to obtain other investors. 
11. Cowan relayed this information to Richardson and 
McGregor, who expressed their interest in meeting with Benz. 
12. On or about November 24, 1981, Remlinger and other 
representatives of Buttonwood met with Benz and Cowan to discuss 
various aspects of a proposal whereby Buttonwood would invest in 
the business venture in question. 
13. On or about December 3, 1981, Richardson and 
McGregor met with Benz and Cowan at Benz's offices in Morristown, 
New Jersey. At that meeting Benz advised Richardson and McGregor 
that he had interested two potential investment groups in 
participating in the proposed business venture. 
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14. The first of these groups involved West Bridge 
Street Corporation, of which Benz is president and principal 
shareholder. Under the terms of this arrangement West Bridge 
Street Corporation would enter into a joint venture with 
McNeil/Mehew, a corporation to be formed in which Richardson and 
McGregor would be the anticipated principals. The terms of this 
arrangement were embodied in the letter of intent c•Letter of 
Intent") duly executed that day, a true copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference herein. 
15. The second group contacted by Benz principally 
involved Remlinger and/or Buttonwood. Benz and Cowan expressly 
conditioned the arranging of any meeting with Remlinger upon the 
agreement of Richardson and McGregor, in advance, that in the 
event Richardson and McGregor and/or McNeil/Mehew entered into an 
agreement with Remlinger and/or Buttonwood, Benz and Cowan would 
receive as compensation for their efforts the sum of Two Hundred 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00) in cash and a fifteen percent 
(15%) interest in any company formed. Richardson and McGregor 
expressly agreed to pay this compensation. 
16. On that same day Benz, Cowan, Richardson and 
McGregor entered into a written Compensation Agreem~nt embodying 
the terms set forth above. A true copy of this agreement is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated by reference herein. 
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17. On December 3, 1981, the meeting with Remlinger was 
held as scheduled. Remlinger, at all relevant times, had notice 
of the terms of the written Compensation Agreement attached hereto 
as Exhibit B. 
18. Immediately following the meeting, Richardson and 
McGregor represented to Benz and Cowan that they were not 
interested in entering into an arrangement with Remlinger and 
would instead pursue the terms of the Letter of Intent attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
19. Notwithstanding such representation, Richardson and 
McGregor subsequently, without notice to Benz and Cowan, entered 
into an arrangement with Remlinger and/or Buttonwood pursuant to 
which McNeil/Mehew was incorporated and capitalized. Richardson, 
McGregor, Remlinger and the partners of Buttonwood became 
officers and directors in McNeil/Mehew. Buttonwood, caruso, 
Cutuli, Di Biasi and Di Mizio contributed $300,000.00 to 
McNeil/Mehew to fund its operations in exchange for stock 
ownership in McNeil/Mehew. Subsequently, Cutuli invested or 
loaned McNeil/Mehew an additional $65,000.00. 
20. Richardson, McGregor, McNeil/Mehew and the other 
defendants have failed and refused to comply with the written 
Compensation Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit B. The monetary 
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value of the fifteen percent (15%) share in the business venture 
is incapable of calculation. 
21. Plaintiffs Benz and Cowan have no adequate remedy at 
law. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment 
against the defendants: 
1. For specific performance of the agreement attached 
hereto as Exhibit B, including payment of $250,000.00, plus 
interest and fifteen percent (15%) of the common stock of 
McNeil/Mehew. 
2. For compensatory damages of $150,000.00 and punitive 
damages of $250,000.00. 
3. For costs of suit. 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems just and 
proper. 
SECOND COUNT 
1. The allegations of the First Count of the Complaint 
are repeated as if set forth at length herein. 
2. As a result of the aforementioned conduct, defendants 
have been, and will continue to be, unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the plaintiffs Benz and Cowan. 
3. Plaintiffs Benz and Cowan have no adeqeuate remedy at 
law. 
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment 
against the defendants: 
1. For compensatory damages of $400,000.00. 
2. For the imposition of a constructive trust on any and 
all profits earned by the defendants pursuant to the arrangement 
among them. 
3. For an accounting. 
4. For costs of suit. 
5. For such other relief as the Court deems just and 
proper. 
THIRD COUNT 
1. The allegations of the First and Second Counts of the 
Complaint are repeated as if set forth at length herein. 
2. As a result of plaintiffs' aforementioned efforts and 
expertise in bringing the defendants together, the financing was 
secured to enable the subsequent incorporation of McNeil/Mehew and 
its successful business operation. 
3. Plaintiffs Benz and Cowan provided defendants 
valuable services for which they have received no compensation. 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to the value of the services 
they rendered to defendants. 
s. Plaintiffs Benz and Cowan have no adequate remedy at 
law. 
-7-
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment 
against the defendants: 
1. For compensatory damages in the amount of $400,000.00. 
2. For costs of suit. 
3. For such other relief as the Court deems just and 
proper. 
FOURTH COUNT 
1. The allegations of the First, Second and Third Counts 
of the Complaint are repeated as if set forth at length herein. 
2. The actions of Remlinger, Buttonwood and the 
defendant partners of Buttonwood intentionally, maliciously and 
without justification induced or otherwise caused Richardson and 
McGregor not to enter into or continue the prospective joint 
venture relation with plaintiffs Benz and Cowan, as evidenced by 
the Letter of Intent, attached as Exhibit A. 
3. Because of the unlawful actions of Remlinger, 
Buttonwood and the defendant partners as alleged above, plaintiffs 
Benz and Cowan have lost substantial profits and have been denied 
a substantial ownership interest in McNeil/Mebew which would have 
resulted from the final execution and performance of the terms set 
forth in the aforementioned Letter of Intent attached as Exhibit A. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment 
against the defendants Remlinger, Buttonwood and the individual 
partners of Buttonwood: 
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1. For compensatory damages of $400,000.00 and punitive 
damages of $250,000.00. 
2. For costs of suit. 
3. For such other relief as the Court deems just and 
proper. 
FIFTH COUNT 
1. The allegations of the First, Second, Third and 
Fourth Counts of the Complaint are repeated as if set forth at 
length herein. 
2. The actions of Remlinger, Buttonwood and the 
defendant partners of Buttonwood intentionally, maliciously and 
without justification induced or otherwise caused Richardson and 
McGregor to breach the written Compensation Agreement with 
plaintiffs Benz and Cowan attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
3. Because of the unlawful actions of Remlinger, 
Buttonwood and the defendant partners alleged above, plaintiffs 
Benz and Cowan have lost substantial profits and have been denied 
a substantial ownership interest in McNeil/Mehew which would have 
resulted from the performance of the aforementioned Compensation 
Agreement. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment 
against the defendants Remlinger, Buttonwood and the individual 
partners of Buttonwood: 
-9-
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1. For compensatory damages of $400,000.00 and punitive 
damages of $250,000.00. 
2. For costs of suit. 
3. For such other relief as the Court deems just and 
proper: 
SIXTH COUNT 
1. The allegations of the First, Second, Third, Fourth 
and Fifth Counts of the Complaint are repeated as if set forth at 
length herein. 
2. The actions of Remlinger, Buttonwood and the 
defendant partners of Buttonwood intentionally, maliciously and 
without justification interfered with the business and contractual 
relations between plaintiffs Benz and Cowan and defendants 
Richardson and McGregor. 
3. Because of the unlawful actions and tortious 
interference of Remlinger, Buttonwood and the individual partners 
of Buttonwood, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan have lost substantial 
profits and economic benefits from their business venture and 
contractual relations with defendants, McGregor and Richardson. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment 
against the defendants Remlinger, Buttonwood and the individual 
partners of Buttonwood: 
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1. For compensatory damages of $400,000.00 and punitive 
damages of $250,000.00. 
2. For costs of suit. 
3. For such other relief as the Court deems just and 
proper. 
SEVENTH COUNT 
1. The allegations of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth.and Sixth Counts of the Complaint are repeated as if set 
forth at length herein. 
2. Plaintiffs Benz and Cowan had a reasonable expecta-
tion of prospective economic advantage from their participation in 
either the arrangement attached hereto as Exhibit A or the 
arrangement attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
3. The actions of the defendants herein jointly and 
severally, maliciously and without justification, interfered with 
plaintiffs' reasonable expectations of prospective economic 
advantage which has caused the plaintiffs the loss of substantial 
profits and economic benefits. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment 
against the defendants: 
1. For compensatory damages of $400,000.00 and punitive 
damages of $250,000.00. 
2. For costs of suit. 
-11-
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proper. 
3. For such other relief as the Court deems just and 
DATED this ?:iri. day of March, 1983. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Merrn o. Baer 
JOA: Adams 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Peter A. Benz and David Cowan 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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~cNe1l/Nebev Croap, Inc. 
&ad We•t Bridge Street Corporet!oa 
Th!• 1 • to coa f! r• oar e gree111ez:i t to for• e • T1.aanc!&l 
111ech•ai•m for e ••r1•• of pa.blic trust th•t will beco•• enotber 
~ortgage !nstr~~ez:it to &ccoapl!sb thi• parpose. 
~he es•entiel terms ere •• follows1 
l. Iz:iJ.tJ.el cap1tal1zet1on U5o,ooo.oo. 
2. In .~~1t1on to the s2so,ooo.oo, there shell be eve11able 
$E~O,OOO.OO e• beck-up fand!ng. 
3. West Bridge Street Corporet1on •hell retain & 45S 
interest 1n the Co:peny 1ncccns1deration for said funding. 
'· HcReil/Hebev Croup shell reta!n e 45S int•r••t. 
5. Jerold Oldroyd, ettorney, shell have lOS interest. 
for celling the beck-ap fand1ng. An~ r.egat!ve vote •a~t be 
based apOD a •oand fuz:idemental bcs!ness reason as to th!• 
Co~peny and •h•ll not be arb1tr&rg. 
7. The Boerd of Director• shell be appointed !D accordance 
v1th tbe 1z:itere•t of tbe •tockholder• •nd •hall con•1•t 
1a1t1•llg of i1ve DJ.rectors. 
f° Y H I 6 I T ''/t " 
The erecat!oa of th!• ~greeaent !• aot b1nd!ag, but !• 
ODlp •D erpreaa!oa Of !nteat. 
J.'e•t ~r!dg• Street Corporet!oa 
B~: Peter A. Benz 
DATEDz Decezr.ber J, 1981 
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COMPENSATION AGR!:E:UO,"T 
It is agreed between the parties hereto that 
should Donald Remlinger and/or Buttonwood Management 
Co. and its associates, affiliates, etc. enter into an 
agreement with the ?1cNeil, Mehew Group, Inc. or Scott 
McGregor and Eldon L. Richar~son, II either eirectly 
or indirectly that David Cowan and Peter Benz shall receive 
compensation as follo~s: (payee's also to include Bob 
Fusar, Doug HUl!le and Richard Anderson) as their interest 
mey appear: 
l. $250,000 cash 
2. A fifteen percent (l5tl interest in 
any Company formed and arising from the afore-
me~tioned agreement. 
This agreement entered into this 3rd day of 
Decem:>er, 1981. 
s/ David Cowan 
s/ Peter A. Benz 
s/ D. Scott ?1cGregor 
s/ Eldon L. Richardson, !I 
EXHIBIT 2 
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